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The subject and the object in a transitive clause should be distinguishable. We discuss five 
different ways in which distinguishability can be obtained: (i) case morphology, (ii) 
agreement, (iii) selectional criteria of the verb, (iv) word order, and (v) prominence, in 
particular animacy. We argue that these different sources of information can be viewed as 
violable and potentially conflicting constraints that play an important role in the incremental 
process of interpretation. We propose a new model of incremental optimization of 
interpretation and argue that we can thus account for the findings of several on-line studies in 




In 1981 a paper appeared by the Dutch linguist Frans Zwarts, entitled “Negatief polaire 
uitdrukkingen 1” (“Negative Polarity Items - part 1”). This title triggered the expectation 
among linguists in the Netherlands that once part 2 on negative polarity items would appear. 
So far this has not happened.  
To call something part 1 triggers the expectation that there is or will be a part 2 as 
well. Maybe this expectation is even stronger if one encounters something that is called part 2: 
there has to be a part 1 then. Similarly, if one encounters an accusatively marked direct object 
in German (a part 2), the expectation is triggered that there must be a subject as well (a part 
1).  
 
(1) Den Zaun habe ich zerbrochen. 
[the fence]ACC have INOM broken 
“I broke the fence.” 
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well as Gerlof Bouma, Petra Hendriks, Irene Krämer, Yukiko Morimoto, Henriëtte de Swart, and Joost Zwarts 
for helpful comments. The Netherlands Organisation of Scientific Research (NWO) is gratefully acknowledged 
for financial support (PIONIER project “Case cross-linguistically”, NWO Cognition project “Conflicts in 
Interpretation”, NWO-DFG project “Incremental interpretation of case and prominence”). 
Within the domain of language comprehension, it is well established that syntactic 
dependencies give rise to predictive parsing (Gibson, 1998). For example, the processing of 
an unambiguously identifiable object will give rise to the prediction of a subject.  
In languages that have ergative case marking, this case marking can be conceived of as 
calling this noun phrase part 1, which gives rise to the expectation that there will be a part 2. 
Note that with respect to subject and object marking, it usually appears to be sufficient to 
mark just one of the two arguments of a two-place predicate (either accusative case on the 
direct object, or ergative case on the subject), the other one can stay unmarked. That is, 
nominative and absolutive case forms (in nominative-accusative and ergative-absolutive 
languages respectively) are often the forms which lack morphological case-marking. An 
example from Yup’ik is given below.  
 
(2) Angutem tangrr-aa arnaq. 
manERG sees womanABS
“The man sees the woman.” 
 
In other words, one function of accusative case and ergative case may be viewed as similar, 
namely as distinguishing between the two arguments of a transitive (two-place) relation. 
Accordingly, whenever there is only one argument, i.e., in the case of a one-place 
predicate, this argument does not have to be case-marked at all from a functional point of 
view. The most unmarked and often morphologically null case is the nominative case in 
nominative-accusative case systems and the absolutive case in ergative-absolutive case 
systems. The morphologically unmarked case is sometimes referred to as the obligatory case 
because it is usually present in both transitive and intransitive sentences (cf. Bobaljik 1993). 
That is, nominative/absolutive case captures the unmarked ‘other part’ of a transitive 
construction as well as the one and only argument of an intransitive construction.  
 
(3) Der Mann tanzt. 
 theNOM man dances 
 “The man dances.” 
 
(4) Arnaq yruar-tuq. 
womanABS dances 
“The woman dances.” 
 In other words, if there is only one argument (of a one-place predicate) it does not have to be 
(case-) marked to distinguish it from another argument. Similarly indeed, it does not make  
sense to call a paper on negative polarity items part 1 if there is no and will not be a part 2. In 
languages that do have morphological case, the case properties of arguments reflect not only 
the grammatical function (part 1 or part 2), but also to a certain degree their thematic and 
other semantic properties. The choice for a certain case may, for instance, depend on temporal 
or aspectual properties of the predicate or on individual properties of the relevant noun phrase 
arguments, such as animacy and specificity (cf. De Swart, this volume). Although this can 
often be related to the distinguishing function of case marking, i.e.,  to avoid (potential) 
ambiguity with respect to the argument structure of a transitive predicate, other cases of 
potential ambiguity may also trigger case-marking. 
 
 
1. Five ways to distinguish between subjects and objects 
 
In the previous section we discussed what might be called a general strategy to avoid 
ambiguity with regard to the arguments in a two-place transitive relation. This leads us to 
propose the following universal constraint: 
 
(5) DISTINGUISHABILITY 
The two arguments of a transitive relation should be distinguishable. 
 
The principle of DISTINGUISHABILITY specifies that, in a transitive relation, the two arguments 
should be distinct from each other (variants of this constraint and elaborate discussions are 
found in recent work, e.g. Bornkessel 2002, Næss 2004, and De Swart 2003, this volume). For 
the sake of convenience, we will refer to the first argument of a transitive relation as the 
subject and to the second one as the object (yet, we are aware of the fact that subject and 
object are grammatical labels that do not always link straightforwardly to the argument 
structure of a transitive verb or do only partially so).  
DISTINGUISHABILITY can be satisfied in many different ways of which we will briefly 
discuss five. One way of distinguishing the two arguments of a transitive relation is by the use 
of morphological marking, in particular case. As we have seen above, two arguments can 
already be distinguished when only one bears unambiguous morphological case marking, e.g., 
when the object bears accusative case. 
Secondly, arguments may be distinguished on the basis of prominence in the sense 
that the subject is often more prominent (in the discourse) than the object. Prominence can be 
measured along different scales, such as animacy, specificity, or (pronominal) person (cf. a.o. 
Comrie 1989, Aissen 2003, Lee 2003). We take animacy to be one important factor on the 
basis of which the condition that the subject outranks the object on a relevant scale of 
discourse prominence may be fulfilled. Although it is not the only factor, we mostly limit 
ourselves in this article to cases in which the subject outranks the object on the scale of 
animacy, that is where the subject is animate while the object is inanimate. At some point, we 
will also see an example in which definiteness or specificity plays a similar role. 
Thirdly, the use of word order may give us a clue as to which argument is the subject 
and which is the object in the transitive sentence, for example when the canonical word order 
is such that the subject precedes the object.  
Fourthly, the verb itself may provide the necessary information in order to distinguish 
the two arguments. For example, please takes an experiencer (animate) object, while like 
takes an experiencer (animate) subject. Therefore, when there is an animate and an inanimate 
noun phrase available, it is clear which one has to be the subject and which one the object in 
the context of one of these verbs. The case of like with an animate subject and an inanimate 
object not only satisfies distinguishability on the basis of selection criteria of the verb, but this 
goes hand in hand with a satisfaction of distinguishability on the basis of prominence or 
animacy. By contrast, the case of please with an animate object and an inanimate subject 
satisfies distinguishability on the basis of selection criteria of the verb but at the same time it 
violates distinguishability on the basis of prominence or animacy, since the subject does not 
outrank the object on the animacy scale.  
Last but not least, agreement with the verb may determine the subject in languages 
such as German and English, and both subject and object in languages with subject and object 
agreement.  
Obviously, there may be other ways to distinguish between the two arguments of a 
transitive relation, such as prosody or surrounding context, but in this paper we will limit our 




2. Conflicts among distinguishability constraints 
 
As outlined above, we conceive of DISTINGUISHABILITY as a family of constraints that 
contribute to the distinguishability of the two arguments of a transitive relation on the basis of 
(i) morphological case marking; (ii) a difference in (discourse) prominence such that the 
subject outranks the object in prominence (e.g., animacy); (iii) word order such that the 
subject precedes the object in linear word order; (iv) selection criteria of the verb, when the 
verb selects an animate subject or an animate object; (v) agreement such that the verb agrees 
with the subject. We will refer to these constraints as CASE, PROMINENCE, PRECEDENCE, 
SELECTION, and AGREEMENT respectively. At this point, let us formulate these constraints in a 
precise way so that they can be evaluated for a given input, and let us determine the ranking 
of the constraints in German.  
 
(6) DISTINGUISHABILITY constraints: 
a. CASE: the subject is in the nominative case, the object is in the accusative 
case 
b. AGREEMENT: the verb agrees with the subject  
c. SELECTION: fit the selectional restrictions of the verb (animacy) 
d. PRECEDENCE: the subject (linearly) precedes the object 
e. PROMINENCE: the subject outranks the object in prominence (animacy) 
 
As a first example of how the constraints are applied in the process of interpretation, consider 
the following German sentence. 
 
(7) Ich habe  den  Zaun  zerbrochen. 
INOM have [the fence]ACC broken 
“I broke the fence.” 
 
In (7) the two arguments of the transitive predicate can be distinguished on the basis of all of 
the DISTINGUISHABILITY-constraints: (i) den Zaun must be the object because of the 
accusative case marking, while the subject is in the nominative; (ii) the finite verb agrees with 
the first person subject, while the object is third person; (iii) the transitive verb to break 
normally selects an animate agent subject; (iv) the arguments are in the canonical order, i.e., 
subject before object; and finally (v) the subject is animate while the object is inanimate. The 
conclusion must be that it will not be hard for a hearer to distinguish between the subject and 
the object in (7) on the basis of the five constraints discussed. This is illustrated with help of 
the following tableau: 
 
(8) Optimal interpretation of sentence (7) 
Ich habe den Zaun zerbrochen CASE AGREEMENT SELECTION PRECEDENCE PROMINENCE
) Subject-initial (SI)      
Object-initial (OI) * * * * * 
  
What we see very clearly in the tableau in (8) is that there is one interpretation which satisfies 
all five constraints. This optimal interpretation is the subject-initial interpretation, the one 
where ich ‘I’ is the subject and den Zaun ‘the fence’ the object.   
The ranking as indicated in the tableau above, where CASE and AGREEMENT are not 
ranked with respect to each other (as can be seen from the dotted line between them) while the 
other constraints are lower ranked (as can be seen from the order in which they occur in the 
tableau), does not follow from the interpretation of sentence (7). Rather, the tableau already 
presents the constraints in the ranking that we will develop in the course of this section. 
Obviously, cases such as (7) in which the optimal candidate does not violate any constraints at 
all do not allow us to determine the ranking within a set of constraints. In order to decide the 
ranking, we need to look at cases in which there is a conflict between constraints. Consider 
sentence (9) for example, where the optimal interpretation turns out to be the object-initial 
interpretation, which is illustrated in the tableau in (10): 
 
(9) Den Zaun  habe  ich zerbrochen. 
[the fence]ACC have INOM broken 
“I broke the fence.” 
 
(10) Optimal interpretation of sentence (9) 
Den Zaun habe ich zerbrochen CASE AGREEMENT SELECTION PRECEDENCE PROMINENCE
  SI * * *  * 
) OI    *  
  
From the constraint violation pattern of the two candidates and the fact that the object-initial 
reading is the winner of the competition, we can deduce the following partial ranking: at least 
one of the constraints CASE, AGREEMENT, SELECTION, or PROMINENCE outranks PRECEDENCE. 
When we consider the interpretation of sentence (11) next, and the tableau in (12), we 
conclude that CASE by itself outranks PRECEDENCE, also when the other constraints are 
(vacuously) satisfied or violated (AGREEMENT because both arguments are third person 
singular, SELECTION and PROMINENCE because both arguments are equally prominent/ 
animate). 
 
(11) Den Lehrer  hat  [der Junge] geschlagen.  
[the teacher]ACC has [the boy]NOM hit 
“The boy hit the teacher.” 
 
(12) Optimal interpretation of sentence (11) 
Den Lehrer hat der Junge 
geschlagen. 
CASE AGREEMENT SELECTION PRECEDENCE PROMINENCE
  SI *    * 
) OI    * * 
  
In the next example then, it becomes clear that in the absence of unambiguous case-marking, 
AGREEMENT by itself outranks PRECEDENCE too: 
 
(13) Die Lehrerinnen  hat  Bernhard  geschlagen.  
[the teachers]NOM/ACC  has BernhardNOM/ACC hit 
“Bernhard hit the teachers.” 
 
(14) Optimal interpretation of (13) 
Die Lehrerinnen hat Bernhard 
geschlagen. 
CASE AGREEMENT SELECTION PRECEDENCE PROMINENCE
  SI  *   * 
) OI    * * 
  
Subsequently, in (15)-(16) the constraint SELECTION (this could also be PROMINENCE, but see 
the discussion later) is shown to outrank PRECEDENCE.  
 (15) Die Jacke  hat Bernhard  gesehen. 
[the coat]NOM/ACC has BernhardNOM/ACC seen 
“Bernhard saw the coat.” 
 
(16) Optimal interpretation of (15) 
Die Jacke hat Bernhard gesehen. CASE AGREEMENT SELECTION PRECEDENCE PROMINENCE
  SI   *  * 
) OI    *  
  
Furthermore, from (17)-(18) we may deduce that CASE outranks SELECTION and PROMINENCE: 
 
 
(17) Der Zaun  hat  Bernhard  zerbrochen.  
[the fence]NOM  has BernhardNOM/ACC broken 
“The fence broke Bernhard.” 
 
(18) Optimal interpretation of (17) 
Der Zaun hat Bernhard zerbrochen. CASE AGREEMENT SELECTION PRECEDENCE PROMINENCE
)   SI   *  * 
OI *   *  
  
That SELECTION outranks PRECEDENCE as well as PROMINENCE is deduced from the object-
initial interpretation obtained for sentence (19), as shown in the tableau in (20). 
 
(19) Bernhard  hat die Vorstellung  deprimiert.  
BernhardNOM/ACC has  [the performance]NOM/ACC  depressed 






(20) Optimal interpretation of (19) 
Bernhard hat die Vorstellung 
deprimiert. 
CASE AGREEMENT SELECTION PRECEDENCE PROMINENCE
   SI   *   
)OI    * * 
  
Finally, we can show that PRECEDENCE outranks PROMINENCE in a context where SELECTION is 
not involved. That is, the verb streifen ‘brush’ does not select for an animate subject nor for 
an animate object and the optimal reading we get for the ambiguous sentence in (21) is the 
subject-initial reading, which satisfies PRECEDENCE yet violates PROMINENCE. 
(21) Die Pflanze  streifte  Bernhard.     
[The plant]NOM/ACC brushed  BernhardNOM/ACC   
“The plant brushed Bernhard.” 
 
(22) Optimal interpretation of (21) 
Die Pflanze streifte Bernhard. CASE AGREEMENT SELECTION PRECEDENCE PROMINENCE
   )SI     * 
OI    *  
  
On the basis of the above sentences and their optimal (i.e., preferred) interpretations, we can 
establish the following ranking of our five DISTINGUISHABILITY constraints: 
 
(23) { CASE, AGREEMENT } >> SELECTION >> PRECEDENCE >> PROMINENCE 
 
We have not been able to determine the ranking between AGREEMENT and CASE, yet both 
constraints are stronger than the others and both give rise to ungrammatical sentences when 
violated. However, in this paper we are not interested in grammaticality per se, but in how the 
constraints and the conflicts among them help the hearer to arrive at the optimal interpretation 
of a given sentence (input).  
Consider sentence (24) as a final example of this optimization process of interpretation. 
 
(24) Die Professorin   hat  die Studentin   geschlagen. 
[the professor]NOM/ACC  has [the student]NOM/ACC hit 
“The professor hit the student.” 
 In sentence (24) CASE cannot distinguish between the two noun phrases as they are both 
ambiguous between nominative and accusative case. Neither can PROMINENCE, SELECTION or 
AGREEMENT make the distinction. In other words, in this sentence only PRECEDENCE  can be 
used to determine which argument is the subject and which one is the object. This constraint 
favours the reading such that the subject precedes the object and this is indeed the reading we 
get, at least when no additional contextual or intonational information to the contrary 
interferes. The following tableau illustrates that the object-initial reading becomes sub-
optimal on the basis of one constraint violation only. 
 
(25) Optimal interpretation of sentence (24) 
Die Professorin hat die Studentin 
geschlagen. 
CASE AGREEMENT SELECTION PRECEDENCE PROMINENCE
   )SI      
OI    *  
  
The phenomenon in which only word order determines the optimal interpretation is known as 
word order freezing in the literature (cf. Lee 2003, Zeevat, to appear). In this example, when 
two arguments of a transitive relation cannot be distinguished on the basis of case, agreement, 
animacy, the selection criteria of the verb or our world knowledge, only the canonical word 
order with its concomitant (subject precedes object) reading is available. Zeevat illustrates the 
phenomenon of freezing with Jakobson’s (1984) observation that the Russian sentence Mat’ 
ljubit doč’ ‘The mother loves the daughter’ only allows a subject initial reading because mat’ 
and doč’ do not have different forms in the nominative and accusative.  
 
3. A model of incremental optimization of interpretation 
 
The theoretical perspective that we have so far taken and will continue to take in the 
remainder of this paper is that of Optimality Theory (cf. Prince and Smolensky 1997, 2004). 
The basic assumption of this type of linguistic theory is that the connectionist well-
formedness measure called Harmony can be used to model linguistic well-formedness. The 
goal of Harmonic Grammar, as well as of its successor Optimality Theory (OT), is to provide 
a framework in which linguistic regularities are expressed by the use of violable rules, rather 
than hard rules. Within this perspective, constraints are naturally conceived of as violable, and 
potentially conflicting. A constraint is never violated without any reason, however, but only in 
order to satisfy another, stronger constraint. The fact that the conditions are soft has far-
reaching consequences: if all possible output candidates violate (or if all satisfy) a certain 
constraint, then this constraint is not relevant anymore for the determination of the optimal 
output.  
This basic principle must have its effects on on-line comprehension. We assume that 
when a sentence (a form) is being processed, i.e., interpreted, the optimal interpretation of this 
form is being built up incrementally. Hence, we assume the process of optimization itself to 
be incremental. We are not the first to explore the use of OT constraints to explain sentence 
processing (cf. Gibson and Broihier 1998, Fanselow et al. 1999, Stevenson and Smolensky 
2005). However, as far as we know we are the first who explore OT semantics rather than OT 
syntax to deal with processing. A subsequent account along these lines is offered by Hoeks 
and Hendriks (2005). We think that Optimality Theoretic semantics (cf. Hendriks and De 
Hoop 2001) gives a straightforward tool for analysing processing. Hendriks and De Hoop 
(2001) take as a point of departure free generation of interpretations in combination with the 
parallel evaluation of violable constraints. The integration of pragmatic, semantic, and 
syntactic information in a system of ranked constraints is proposed to correctly derive the 
optimal interpretations for inputs that consist of utterances, i.e., forms. So, in OT semantics, 
the direction of optimization is from form to meaning, it is optimization from the hearer’s 
point of view. To use this approach for our purpose of analysing experimental results of 
processing requires an incremental approach to optimization. That is, the process of 
optimization of interpretation proceeds while the information comes in word by word, or 
constituent by constituent (for a similar approach to the role of animacy in transitive relations, 
see Lamers & de Hoop, 2005). 
How does this work? We will illustrate the idea with help of two examples, first the 
incremental optimization of sentence (7), repeated below for convenience. 
 
(26) Ich habe  den  Zaun  zerbrochen. 
INOM have [the fence]ACC broken 
“I broke the fence.” 
 
As we have argued above, the optimal interpretation of sentence (26) is the subject-initial 
interpretation. But how does this interpretation come about in the course of processing the 
sentence? We assume that hearers start to optimize the interpretation of an incoming sentence 
right away. When the first noun phrase of (26) comes in, the optimal interpretation is the 
subject-initial interpretation as that one does not violate any of the relevant constraints, while 
the object-initial interpretation would immediately violate PRECEDENCE  as well as CASE. This 
is shown in the following tableau:  
 
(27) Incremental optimization of sentence (26): Stage I  
Ich... CASE AGREEMENT SELECTION PRECEDENCE PROMINENCE
   )SI      
OI *   *  
  
At the next incoming word, habe ‘have’, the subject-initial interpretation would be maintained 
while at the third constituent, den Zaun ‘the fence’, the object-initial interpretation would 
moreover violate AGREEMENT and PROMINENCE . 
 
(28) Incremental optimization of sentence (26): Stage III 
Ich habe den Zaun... CASE AGREEMENT SELECTION PRECEDENCE PROMINENCE 
   )SI      
OI * *  * * 
  
Finally, at the last word, the verb, the object-initial interpretation would cause a violation of 
SELECTION as well.  
 
(29) Incremental optimization of sentence (26): Stage IV 
Ich habe den Zaun zerbrochen. CASE AGREEMENT SELECTION PRECEDENCE PROMINENCE
   )SI      
OI * * * * * 
  
Clearly, then, the subject-initial interpretation is maintained as the optimal interpretation from 
the first word until the last one, whereas the Harmony value of the object-initial interpretation 
more and more decreases in time.  
Not all sentences maintain the same optimal interpretation in the course of processing. 
We also find examples that show a ‘jump’ from one optimal interpretation to another at a 
certain stage. For example, reconsider sentence (15), repeated below as (30), and note that in 
this case we begin with a subject-initial reading as the optimal interpretation but we end up 
with the object-initial reading as the optimal one.  
 
(30) Die Jacke  hat Bernhard  gesehen.  
[the coat]NOM/ACC has BernhardNOM/ACC seen 
“Bernhard saw the coat.” 
 
How does this interpretation arise incrementally? When the first noun phrase is encountered, 
we interpret it as the subject despite the violation of PROMINENCE that this interpretation gives 
rise to, since the other candidate reading, the object-initial one, would violate the higher 
ranked constraint PRECEDENCE. Crucially, the case morphology is ambiguous between 
nominative and accusative marking. 
 
(31) Incremental optimization of sentence (30): Stage I 
Die Jacke... CASE AGREEMENT SELECTION PRECEDENCE PROMINENCE 
   )SI     * 
OI    *  
  
Because the second noun phrase is ambiguous in case-marking as well, and moreover, both 
noun phrases are third person singular, the subject-initial reading is actually maintained as the 
optimal interpretation until the final word, the verb. Then, SELECTION comes into play, and the 
result is that the object-initial interpretation becomes the optimal one. This is illustrated in the 
tableau below: 
 
(32) Incremental optimization of sentence (30): Stages III and IV 
Die Jacke hat 
Bernhard... 
<III> 
…gesehen.    
<IV> 
CASE AGREEMENT SELECTION PRECEDENCE PROMINENCE
   )SI    SI   *  * 
OI )OI    *  
  
So, while at stage III the subject-initial reading is still the optimal one, at stage IV we observe 
a crucial change. Due to the selection properties of the verb gesehen ‘seen’, the best 
interpretation is now the object-initial one, since only that one can satisfy SELECTION (to see 
requires an animate subject), at the cost of violating PRECEDENCE though. In the tableau above 
the constraint violation pattern corresponds to the fourth stage only. In the earlier stage (stage 
III), SELECTION had not been violated yet because the verb had not been processed yet. We 
say that the hearer ‘jumps’ from the subject-initial reading of stage III to the object-initial 
reading of stage IV. 
 Obviously, we have also seen examples where the object-initial reading is the optimal 
one right from the beginning. This is for example the case with respect to sentence (1) above, 
where because of its unambiguous case morphology Den Zaun ‘the fenceACC’ is readily 
interpreted as the object despite the fact that it is sentence-initial.  
Finally, it goes without saying that the DISTINGUISHABILITY subconstraints we have 
discussed above are not the only constraints that play a part in determining the optimal 
interpretation of transitive sentences. And satisfaction of DISTINGUISHABILITY may itself be in 
conflict with other violable constraints, such as, from the perspective of the speaker, a 
constraint that penalizes marking of an otherwise unmarked argument (cf. Malchukov, this 
volume).  
 
4. Processing effects related to distinguishability  
 
Having proposed our new model of incremental optimization of interpretation, we can use it 
to evaluate sentences used in on-line studies in which DISTINGUISHABILITY was manipulated. 
We will apply our model to four studies in which event related brain potentials were 
measured, two studies by Lamers (2001), one by Frisch and Schlesewsky (2001), and one by 
Schlesewsky and Frisch (submitted). The latter two studies are discussed in Schlesewsky and 
Bornkessel (2004).  
Event related brain potentials (ERPs) are small changes in spontaneous electrical 
activity of the brain that occur in response to certain stimuli. They can be recorded 
continuously and noninvasively by means of electrodes attached to the scalp. Because of the 
high temporal resolution of the ERP signal with its various dimensions, ERPs have been 
proven to be particularly useful to investigate the time-course of brain activity related to 
language processing without introducing an extra unrelated task. One well-known effect 
(“component”) is the so-called N400, which is an enhanced negative effect with a peak around 
400 ms post-stimulus largest over central and right posterior electrode sites that is found for 
difficulties related to semantic/pragmatic integration processes. In relation to syntactic 
difficulties a late positivity has been reported with an onset of approximately 500 ms with a 
maximum at 600 ms after onset of the critical word at centroparietal sites (usually referred to 
as the P600). In this section, we will discuss some relevant ERP-effects in terms of 
incremental distinguishability between subjects and objects when interpreting transitive 
sentences. We evaluate the information constituent by constituent against the ranked 
constraints CASE >> SELECTION >> PRECEDENCE >> PROMINENCE (AGREEMENT will not play a 
role in the remainder of this article) under the assumption that Dutch has the same ranking as 
German. 
Lamers (2001) in two ERP studies investigated Dutch sentences such as given in (33), 
(34) and (35):  
 
(33) De oude vrouw in the straat  verzorgde  hem … 
        the old woman in the street  took-care-of  him  … 
       “The old woman in the street took care of him  …” 
 
(34) Het oude park in the straat  verzorgde  hij … 
       the old park in the street  took-care-of  he … 
     “He took care of the old park in the street …” 
 
(35) De oude vrouw in the straat  verzorgde  hij … 
     the old woman in the street  took-care-of  he … 
       “He took care of the old woman in the street …” 
  
When people start to interpret sentences (33)-(35), they interpret the initial noun phrase as the 
subject (in accordance with PRECEDENCE). However, when the verb is encountered, the 
inanimate initial noun phrase in (34) can no longer be interpreted as the subject because of the 
selectional restrictions of the verb (verzorgde ‘took care of’ requires an animate subject). The 
sentences in (33) and (35), on the other hand, maintain the subject-initial reading as the 
optimal interpretation until the second noun phrase. However, when the nominative case-
marked pronoun is encountered in (35), CASE overrules PRECEDENCE. As a result, the object-
initial reading becomes the optimal interpretation for (35). Only sentence (33) can maintain 
the preferred subject-initial reading until the very end of the sentence. 
At this point, let us have a look at the the tableau of sentence (33). The interpretations 
at the three stages of processing are given in the first three columns. The violation pattern of 
the constraints shown in the three rightmost columns of the tableau reflects the pattern of only 
the final - third – stage (in the first two stages, CASE is not violated by the object-initial 
reading yet, only PRECEDENCE is). The subject-initial reading is maintained throughout the 
three stages of interpretation. Only the three distinguishability constraints that are relevant for 
this example are given in the tableau. 
 
(36) Incremental optimization of sentence (33): Stages I, II and III 
De oude vrouw… 
‘the old lady’ 
<I> 
verzorgde… 





CASE SELECTION PRECEDENCE 
 )SI )SI )SI    
OI OI OI *  * 
 
Subsequently, consider the tableau in (37) below that gives the incremental interpretation of 
sentence (34). Up to the verb SELECTION does not play a role in the parsing process but at the 
verb, it becomes clear that the subject has to be animate. Hence, the optimal interpretation of 
the initial inanimate NP changes from subject to object. The optimal (object-initial) 
interpretation clearly violates PRECEDENCE but the stronger constraint SELECTION is satisfied. 
The incremental interpretation of sentence (34) involves a ‘jump’ from the subject-initial to 
the object-initial interpretation. It is at this point in the sentence (i.e., at the verb) that Lamers 
(2001) found significant ERP effects (early and late positivities) for sentence (34) compared 
to (33).  
 
(37) Incremental optimization of sentence (34): Stages I and II 
Het oude park… 
‘the old park’ 
<I> 
verzorgde… 
‘took care of’ 
<II> 
CASE SELECTION PRECEDENCE
 )SI SI  *  
OI )OI   * 
 
Finally, the tableau in (38) presents a schematic overview of the constraint violations pattern 
of the crucial words of sentence (35). 
  
 
(38) Incremental optimization of sentence (35): Stages I, II and III 
De oude vrouw… 
‘the old lady’ 
<I> 
verzorgde… 





CASE SELECTION PRECEDENCE 
 )SI )SI SI *   
OI OI )OI   * 
 
Let us now compare the pattern of constraint violations found at the nominative case-marked 
pronoun to the pattern observed at the verb of the sentence starting with the inanimate NP. At 
the nominative case-marked pronoun the object-initial interpretation overrules the subject-
initial interpretation, which was optimal until that point. At that time (i.e., at the second noun 
phrase), we get a similar ‘jump’ from one interpretation to the other, as we have seen with 
respect to the incremental interpretation of sentence (34). Again, the object-initial 
interpretation violates PRECEDENCE but the stronger constraint, CASE, is satisfied. In other 
words, the resulting pattern is basically the same pattern as the one created at the verb in the 
inanimate condition (34). And since Lamers found similar ERP effects, i.e., early and late 
positivities at the case-marked pronoun in (35) as well as at the verb in (34), we conclude that 
the ERP effects indeed reflect the similar constraint violation patterns in our model. Note that 
until the pronoun is encountered PROMINENCE does not play a role because only one argument 
is present. The nominative case-marked pronoun is the second argument and then it becomes 
clear that both arguments are animate. However, we assume that PROMINENCE is not violated 
since in discourse/animacy hierarchies pronouns are considered to be higher in prominence 
than noun phrases (cf. Yamamoto 1999). 
An interesting question is whether structures in which different (types of) constraints 
are violated give rise to (qualitatively) different effects (in terms of ERP measures). We will 
show below that existing evidence from German suggests that a violation of PROMINENCE is 
associated with an N400. First, consider the following (ungrammatical) indirect questions that 
were used in an experiment by Frisch & Schlesewsky (2001): 
 
(39) *… welcher Bischof   der Zweig  streifte. 
       … [which bishop]NOM  [the twig]NOM  brushed 
 
(40) *… welcher Bischof   der Priester   begleitete. 
       … [which bishop]NOM  [the priest]NOM  accompanied 
 Both sentences above are rendered ungrammatical at the position of the second noun phrase 
because sentences with two nominative arguments are ill-formed in German. In other words, 
in both sentences CASE is vacuously violated, albeit unexpectedly. In terms of 
DISTINGUISHABILITY, the second nominative-marked argument induces a problem, since the 
case marking of each argument suggests that this argument is the subject. However, the 
sentences differ with respect to PROMINENCE. The latter constraint can still be satisfied in (39) 
where the two arguments differ in terms of animacy, but not in (40) where there is no 
difference in animacy between the two noun phrases. Hence, in addition to the violation of 
CASE in both sentences, sentence (40) is ‘worse’ or more difficult to process since 
PROMINENCE is violated as well. And indeed, Frisch & Schlesewsky (2001) observed a 
biphasic ERP pattern of an N400 and a P600 component for the ungrammatical sentence (40), 
while only a P600 for the equally ungrammatical (39), in comparison to minimally differing, 
grammatical control conditions.  
Thus, the N400 in the above example apparently reflects a violation of PROMINENCE 
and therefore in combination with the lack of a morphological case distinction a reduced 
fulfilment of DISTINGUISHABILITY. Although the sentences in (39) and (40) are equally 
ungrammatical because both noun phrases bear nominative case, sentence (40) gives rise to an 
extra processing problem because of the violation of PROMINENCE. In a tableau: 
 








 )SI )SI *   
OI OI * * ** 
 
We assume that the object initial reading of sentence (39) gives in fact a double violation of 
PROMINENCE because not only does the subject fail to outrank the object in animacy, but 
moroever, the object outranks the subject. We need to assume this ‘double violation’ (the 
object outranks the subject in animacy) also in order to be able to explain the findings of the 
other ERP study, that we discuss at the end of this section. Now compare the tableau in (41) 
to the tableau in (42) which represents the incremental interpretation of sentence (40): 
 







CASE PRECEDENCE PROMINENCE 
 )SI )SI *  * 
OI OI * * * 
 
The difference between the constraint violation patterns of sentence (39) and (40) is clearly a 
difference with respect to the distinguishability condition PROMINENCE and that difference 
gives rise to an N400 at the second noun phrase in sentence (40). As we can see from a 
comparison of the constraint violation patterns of the optimal subject-initial interpretation, the 
N400 in stage II of the processing of (40) in comparison to the sentence in (39) corresponds to 
a violation of PROMINENCE. In principle, PRECEDENCE would still favour the subject-initial 
reading. However, as Vogel (2004) pointed out, the effect of PRECEDENCE is much weaker, or 
even seems to disappear, when one noun phrase is a wh-phrase, while the other is not. This 
corresponds to the fact that a wh-phrase preferably occupies the sentence-initial position for 
reasons of question-marking and question-scope, so we may expect a conflict between 
PRECEDENCE and a constraint of wh-movement here (cf. Ackema and Neeleman 1998). 
Whatever the exact role of PRECEDENCE is in (39) and (40), it cannot make a difference 
between the sentences, while on the other hand PROMINENCE clearly distinguishes between the 
two. 
 We would like to argue that in German the absence of accusative case-marking is 
worse in sentence (40) than in (39) because in (40) both noun phrases are animate, although in 
fact both (39) and (40) are ungrammatical due to the lack of accusative case. In other 
languages, we find a similar effect of animacy. In Malayalam, for instance, accusative case-
marking is only present when the subject and the object are both animate (as in (44)). 
However, if the subject outranks the object in animacy (as in (43)), distinguishability is saved 
and the accusative case-marking is omitted (Asher and Kumari, 1997). 
 
(43) aan teenjnja vaanjnji. 
I  coconut  bought 
   “I bought a coconut.” 
 
(44) avan oru pasjuvin-e vanjnji. 
 he a cow-ACC bought 
“He bought a cow.”  
 Another trigger for an N400 effect arises at the position of an inanimate second argument in 
indirect questions, in comparison to an animate nominative argument in the same position 
(Schlesewsky & Bornkessel, 2004). Schlesewsky and Bornkessel (2004) discuss some results 
from Schlesewsky and Frisch (submitted) indicating that the processing of an initial animate 
accusative marked wh-argument gives rise to the prediction of an animate, nominative marked 
argument. If this prediction is not borne out and an inanimate nominative argument is 
encountered instead, an N400 is elicited. Thus, sentence (46) shows an N400 effect at the 
second noun phrase compared to sentence (45):  
 
(45) … welchen Bischof   der Priester   begleitete. 
       … [which bishop]ACC   [the priest]NOM  accompanied 
(46) … welchen Bischof   der Zweig  streifte. 
       … [which bishop]ACC   [the twig]NOM  brushed 
 
We claim that the N400 effect again reflects a (worse) violation of  PROMINENCE. We assume 
that while a constraint such as PRECEDENCE can only be satisfied (when the subject precedes 
the object) or violated (when the object precedes the subject), a constraint like PROMINENCE 
can be violated to different degrees. One violation (indicated with one asterisk) is when the 
subject does not outrank the object in prominence (e.g., the subject and object are either both 
animate, or they are both inanimate). A worse violation (indicated with two asterisks) is when 
the object in fact outranks the subject, which is the case in sentence (46). Consider the 
corresponding tableaux: 
 







CASE PRECEDENCE PROMINENCE 
 SI SI *  * 












CASE PRECEDENCE PROMINENCE 
 SI SI *   
)OI )OI  * ** 
 
As we can see from a comparison of the constraint violation patterns, the N400 for sentence 
(46) compared to sentence (45) corresponds to a worse violation of  PROMINENCE  under the 
optimal (here the object-initial) interpretation. The object-initial interpretation is optimal in 
both sentences because the subject-initial interpretation would induce a violation of the 
highest ranked constraint CASE. The difference between (45) and (46) is that in (46) the object 
in fact outranks the subject in terms of animacy and thus, we get a worse violation of 
PROMINENCE than when there is no difference in animacy between the subject and the object, 
as in (45). Again similar ERP effects from two studies (Frisch and Schlesewsky 2001, 
Schlesewsky and Frisch, submitted) appear to reflect similar constraint violation patterns in 




When a hearer or reader interprets a transitive sentence, the two arguments of the transitive 
verb, to wit the subject and the object, should be distinguishable. We claim that such 
disinguishability is guaranteed by violable DISTINGUISHABILITY-subconstraints, that 
distinguish between transitive subjects and objects on the basis of (i) case morphology, (ii) 
agreement, (iii) selectional criteria of the verb, (iv) word order, and (v) prominence, in 
particular animacy. In this paper we have shown how the application of DISTINGUISHABILITY 
may be examined from an incremental optimization perspective. We propose a new model of 
incremental optimization of interpretation and we argue that this model can straightforwardly 
account for the findings of several on-line studies in which DISTINGUISHABILITY was 
manipulated. We have shown that the violation patterns that come about by checking the 
constraints incrementally (i.e. on each word or constituent) correspond to the differences in 
waveforms found in the relevant ERP studies.  
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